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ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of a local content requirement (LCR) in the context of potential vertical
cooperation between a host country’s upstream and downstream producers and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in upstream manufacturing by a foreign multinational. The relationship- specific
investment which sustains cooperation also allows the host country firms to commit to a FDI pre-
empting strategy through manipulation of the price of intermediates supplied to the foreign firm. It
is found that depending on the presence of economies of scale in the upstream industry and the cost
advantage of the multinational, the LCR can either induce cooperation and increase host country
profits, or reduce the incentives to cooperate and induce FDI. In the latter case, the LCR reduces
profits of all firms but benefits consumers.
1. Introduction
There is now an extensive body of literature analysing the welfare and resource allocation
effects of local content requirements (LCRs). Early work was inspired by the frequent use of LCRs
in less developed countries and focused on the resource-allocating effects of LCRs aimed at
developing the local intermediate goods industry [Corden (1971), Grossman (1981), Dixit and
Grossman (1982), Mussa (1984), Vousden (1987)]. These studies typically assumed perfectly
competitive industries, although the case of intermediate goods monopoly has also received
attention. Krishna and Itoh (1988) extended this line of work by examining the effects of LCRs in
case of an oligopolistic intermediate goods industry. Recent work has adopted a general equilibrium
approach to analyse the welfare effects of LCRs under sector-specific unemployment [Chao and Yu
(1993)], and with variable labor supply [Fung (1994)].
The use of LCRs in industrialised countries has given rise to another line of research focusing
on the strategic rent shifting effects of LCRs in imperfectly competitive industries [Davidson et al.
(1987), Richardson (1991), Lopes-de-Silanes et al. (1996), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997)].
The growing importance of rules of origin with the creation of regional trade blocs such as the
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) provides an example of such LCRs. Rules of
origin are often designed to target the less integrated manufacturing operations of foreign-owned
firms in oligopolistic industries. They aim to enhance the competitive position of domestic final
goods producers by forcing similar procurement conditions on to foreign firms. The NAFTA rule of
origin for automobiles, for examples, implies that cars assembled in NAFTA countries can only be
traded duty-free within the region if at least 62.5 percent of value added is generated within the trade
bloc. This rule d facto affected the operations of Japanese firms in a discriminatory way. Lopes-de
Silanes et al. (1996) analyzed the anti-competitive and rent shifting effects of a LCR in conjunction
with a voluntary export restraint (VER) using a calibrated general-equilibrium model of the North
American auto industry. Earlier work by Davidson et al. (1987) focused on the cost increasing
effects of LCRs when the final goods industry is a duopoly of a domestic firm and a foreign
assembler, but did not consider repercussions on the intermediate goods market. Richardson (1991)
took a similar duopoly setup but endowed the duopolists with market power on a perfectly
competitive intermediate goods market. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997) examined the case of
successive market power in intermediate goods and final goods industries. The latter study took its
inspiration from LCRs embodied in an anti-circumvention clause in the European Union's
antidumping law, which targeted Japanese firms assembling electronics products in Europe. A
central result of these studies is that LCRs can have anti-competitive output reducing effects, while
both domestic welfare and profits of domestic final goods producers can be negatively affected. This
is because the LCR increases demand for intermediate goods and pushes up intermediate goods
prices, which negatively affects domestic final goods producers. In Richardson (1991) and Lopes-
de-Silanes et al. (1996) this price increase stems from increased factor costs in a competitive
intermediate goods industry, while in Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997) the price increase stems
from increased market power of an oligopolistic intermediate goods industry. Beghin and Sumner
(1992) have recently shown that the output reducing effects of LCRs can be avoided in case of
cooperative bargaining between the final goods and intermediate goods industries. They found in a
bilateral monopoly setting that -even non-binding- LCRs will shift profits from the final goods
industry to the intermediate goods industry without affecting output or final goods prices. Beghin
and Knox Lovell (1993) showed that the cooperative bargaining model can be applied to the
Australian tobacco and tobacco leaf industries, where LCRs have been present and vertical
cooperation has been supported by the government.
As diverse as the literature on LCRs has become, two issues of empirical relevance have still
been largely ignored. First, the possibility of foreign direct investment (FDI) in local intermediates
production by the foreign firms as a response to the imposition of LCRs has not received due
attention. There is abundant evidence, both in the US car industry and the EU electronics industry,
that Japanese firms responded by further integrating their overseas production or arrange for
intermediate goods suppliers in the vertical business group (keiret u) t  set up plants abroad [e.g.
Belderbos (1997, chapter 2)]. Two studies of LCRs have taken FDI into account but are not readily
applicable to LCR-induced FDI in oligopolistic car and electronics industries. Hollander (1987)
considered welfare effects of a foreign multinational responding to a LCR by shifting more
production stages to the host country, and found that small LCRs can increase welfare. Richardson
(1993) extended the analysis of LCRs to include international capital flows in the intermediate
goods sector. In a general equilibrium framework under perfect competition and constant returns to
scale, he obtained that LCRs no longer affect the price of the intermediate good.
A second and related issue is vertical cooperation or vertical integration between domestic
firms in a strategic rent shifting framework. The literature on rent shifting LCRs has consistently
assumed that the domestic intermediate goods industry sells on arm's length markets to the final
goods industry.1 The foreign final goods producers are treated as vertically integrated and reliant on
imports of intermediates from related foreign plants, which provides the rationale for the imposition
of the LCR in the first place. Once domestic firms are able to cooperate or vertically integrate, the
LCR may allow strategic pricing of the intermediate good for sale to the foreign firms in order to
reap additional profits on the final goods market. Vertical foreclosure of the foreign firm is a
possibility, but the foreign firm is likely to respond by setting up its own intermediate goods plant in
the LCR imposing country.2
There is one well documented example of LCRs and vertical integration by domestic firms:
color televisions and colour television tubes in the European Union. In the 1970s, a range of import
barriers for Japanese televisions as well as restrictive licensing policies for European PAL
broadcasting technology, prompted all major Japanese television manufacturers to invest in
European production facilities. Most of the plants were set up in the United Kingdom, at the time
the largest European market for televisions. The Japanese firms had an apparent preference for the
use of components from Japan, but their European manufacturing operations have been subject to a
number of LCRs. A 45 percent of value added criterion applied until 1992 in case the UK-produced
televisions were to be exported duty free to France, Spain, and Italy,3 a d the J panese firms
reportedly had to agree with a request from the UK government to attain a 70 percent local content
ratio [Burton and Saelens (1987)].4 To satisfy these requirements, local sourcing of television tubes,
which can make up 40 percent of the value of a television, became a necessity. Television tubes in
Europe, however, were until recently only produced by the three vertically integrated European
                                                   
1 Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997) briefly discuss the consequences of vertical cooperation between domestic
intermediate goods and final goods producers.
2 This situation has broad similarities with the vertical foreclosure models developed in Spencer and Jones (1991,
1992) and Rodrik and Yoon (1989). These models consider the impact of host country trade policies on the
supply of intermediate goods by a vertically integrated foreign firm to domestic final goods producers. In case the
foreign firm decides to vertically foreclose the host country firms, the latter may set up their own local
intermediate goods production.
3 France, Italy, and Spain maintained strict national quota for Japanese television imports and in practice UK-
produced televisions were counted in the quota if they did not satisfy the EC's rules of origin for color televisions
[Belderbos (1997, chapter 1)].
4 In addition, Japanese firms reportedly promised to limit exports of television tubes to the EC in a 1982
agreement between the EC Commission and Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry [Tyson (1992,
Chapter 6)]. The EC also maintains a 15 percent tariff on tube imports, providing further incentives for local
procurement of tubes.
television producers: Philips of the Netherlands, Thomson of France, and Nokia of Finland. Major
Japanese producers such as Matsushita (maker of the Panasonic and Quasar brands), Hitachi, and
Sanyo have since the 1970s bought tubes for their European operations from these European firms.5
In contrast, Japanese firms have set up several production facilities for a number of other television
parts such as tuners, power sources, and plastic moldings. The high plant setup cost and the
substantial economies of scale in television tube production made FDI a less cost-effective option,
in particular given the initial small scale of Japanese firms' EU manufacturing operations. The only
Japanese firm which set up its own European tube plant in the 1980s was Sony. Sony uses a
proprietary tube standard and is by far the largest Japanese television producer in Europe.
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of LCRs in the context of vertical
cooperation between domestic firms and FDI by foreign firms. A model is developed which extends
the cooperative bargaining analysis of Beghin and Sumner (1992) to a strategic rent shifting
framework with imperfect competition. While designed to encompass the EU television case, the
model has a broader setup and allows for vertical cooperation between host firms to arise as an
equilibrium outcome. The setup is simple, with a domestic monopolist supplying intermediates to a
domestic final goods producer and a foreign multinational (in case of a LCR). A LCR hits the
multinational in a discriminatory way since it prefers to imports all intermediates from its own plant
abroad in the absence of such a requirement. The imposition of the LCR can under certain
circumstances increase the likelihood that the domestic firms choose for vertical cooperation. In this
case they find it beneficial to set the price of the intermediate for sale to the foreign multinational
such that the latter firm finds local sourcing from the domestic firms more cost-effective than FDI.
The potential of such a ‘FDI pre-empting’ strategy depends crucially on the presence of a cost
advantage of the foreign firm and the degree of scale economies in intermediate goods production.
The welfare effects of LCRs in case of potential vertical cooperation and FDI are generally more
likely to be positive than in the absence of these possibilities.
                                                   
5 See Belderbos (1997, Chapters 1 and 4) and "TV maker sees end to a local difficulty", Financial Times, 18
March 1994. Recently, Samsung of Korea has set up a tube plant in Germany and in December 1994 Matsushita
acquired Nokia's two German tube plants (“Matsushita Acquires Nokia Tube Factory”, Financial Times, 1
December 1994).
The analysis also links up with the recent game theoretical literature on strat gic foreign direct
investment.6 Although this literature has paid attention to the effects of trade policies, it has not
examined the vertical relationship with the intermediate goods industry.7 The presen  paper extends
this literature by introducing the notion that vertical cooperation between domestic firms can
facilitate the pre-emption of FDI and hence has a special strategic significance. It models a game in
which the domestic firms act as leader and decide on cooperation after which the foreign firm
chooses between FDI and local sourcing. The equilibrium outcomes of this game are examined
under alternative values of the LCR and different cost configurations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main
assumptions of model and establishes conditions under which the different outcomes occur. Section
3 examines the effects of a LCR on the domestic firms’ decision to cooperate and the foreign firm’s
choice between local sourcing and FDI. Section 4 examines the welfare implications and Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
Consider two downstream firms, labeled d (domestic or downstream) and f (foreign),
assembling identical final goods in a host country and selling these on the host country market.
Nash-Cournot equilibrium prevails on the final goods market. The inverse demand function for the
final good is P q q sd f= - -1 ( ) / , where s measures the size of the host country market, and
qd  and q f represent the output of firm d and firm f, respectively. The production technology is
such that one unit of labour and one unit of the intermediate good are needed to produce one unit of
the final good. The firms are price-takers in the labour market at unit wage w which, without loss of
generality, is set to zero. The domestic downstream firm procures intermediates from a domestic
upstream firm, labeled u (upstream), which produces at constant marginal cost cu . The domestic
firms may consider to vertically cooperate by entering into Nash bargaining to determine price and
volume of the intermediate good. Following the stylized facts of the European color television case,
                                                   
6 e.g. Smith (1987), Dei (1990), Motta (1992), Cordella and Vannini (1995), Sanna-Randaccio (1996) and Motta
and Norman (1996).
the foreign multinational at the outset imports all intermediate goods from its plant abroad. This
preference for imports may be based on a marginal cost advantage in serving the European market:
firm f is assumed to produce intermediates abroad at constant marginal cost c f , while
c t cf u+ £ , where t  are unit transport and tariff costs. The intermediate goods produced by
firms u and f are assumed to be perfect substitutes.
The host country government now imposes a LCR which requires that final goods producers
procure at least a certain specified proportion e  (0 < e  £ 1)of the intermediate goods it needs for
final goods assembly in the host country.8 The foreign firm then faces the choice between procuring
the required share of intermediates from firm u, and setting up its own intermediate goods plant in
the host country. In the latter case, a plant-specific fixed cost G  has to be incurred, but the unit
transport and tariff cost t  is avoided and marginal costs are c f .9
In order to examine the strategic effects of vertical cooperation we consider the following three-
stage game. In the first stage, firms u and d decide whether to vertically cooperate. The advantages
of cooperation depend on the choice of firm f between local sourcing and FDI in the second stage of
the game. Firms u and d move first and choose between cooperation and non-cooperation taking
account of the best response of firm f. In the third stage quantity competition takes place and the
price of the intermediate good is determined. The equilibrium is subgame-perfect and solved
backwards. Firms maximize the aggregate of variable profits minus fixed costs. Let P k
i  repre ent
variable profits of firm , with i Î {u, d, f}. The subscript k  denotes the four possible outcomes
of the game: NF (non-cooperation and FDI), CF (cooperation and FDI), NL (non-cooperation and
local sourcing), and CL (cooperation and local sourcing). The various outcomes of the game
involve different payoffs to the firms.
In case firms u and d do not cooperate, upstream firm u is assumed to be endowed with market
power on the intermediate goods market while the downstream firms take the price of the
                                                                                                                                                    
7 Bughin and Vannini (1994) examined vertical effects, but focused on the influence of union-firm bargaining on
FDI decisions.
8 The LCR considered is a physical local content scheme appropriate in a setting of homogeneous intermediates.
The early literature has also considered value added content protection schemes [Grossman (1981), Hollander
(1987), and Krishna and Itoh (1988)].
9 In other words, firm f is able to transfer its cost advantage to its plant abroad.
intermediate as given.10 Vertical cooperation occurs if firms u and d can reach an agreement on a
pair (p qd d, ), where p d denotes the price which firm u charges firm d for the intermediate good.
Following Beghin and Sumner (1992), the generalized Nash cooperative bargaining game is used
to approach the bargaining problem between the host firms (the description of this bargaining game
is relegated to the appendix). If a cooperative solution is not reached, conflict payoffs are equal to
profits under upstream leadership. Vertical cooperation has the advantage that it eliminates the
mark-up on intra-group deliveries of intermediates, improving the competitive position of firm d on
the final goods market. On the other hand, cooperation does involve costs. For instance, in order to
deal with opportunistic behavior, the firms may have to set up an audit mechanism and incur
monitoring costs.11 Cooperation will involve relationship-specific investments to express a mutual
commitment to cooperation [Chung (1995)]. Irreversible investments which are specific to the
vertical relationship cannot be utilized for other purposes in case the firms withdraw from the
cooperative agreement. We let F F FT u d= +  denote the fixed investment cost associated with
cooperation (a superscript T denotes total cost) which is not necessarily evenly distributed among
the two domestic firms.
In the cooperative bargaining framework, the decision to cooperate depends on the extent to
which cooperation allows for an increase in joint variable profits. An individual firm cooperates if
its share of this increase in profits (which depends on its bargaining power) is greater than the cost
of cooperation it has to incur. The profit gain in case of cooperation not only stem from the
efficiency advantage through the elimination of the internal mark-up, they also involve a strategic
advantage. With the LCR imposed, cooperation allows for the strategic setting of the intermediate
goods price p f  charged to firm f, while p d  is determined in the internal bargaining process.12 The
sunk cost F T  has a commitment value which allows the domestic firms to credibly commit to such
                                                   
10 This price-taking assumption has been frequently used in the literature [e.g., Greenhut and Ohta (1978),
Waterson (1982), Salinger (1988), and Sleuwaegen et. al (forthcoming)]. A leadership position of the upstream
firm may stem from the imposition of the LCR which increases market power of upstream firms [Grossman
(1981)], and from pre-committed investments in the technology and capacity to produce intermediates. It is also
assumed that the cost of acquiring the technology to produce the intermediate goods precludes firm d from setting
up it own production.
11 The management literature identifies further potential costs of cooperation and coalitions: coordination costs,
erosion of competitive position, and creation of an adverse bargaining position [Porter (1986], competitive
compromise, dependency spiral, and distrust and conflict [Hamel et al. (1989)]. D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994)
provide examples of the costs associated with vertical integration, and Williamson (1989) provides a general
analysis of the governance costs associated with contractual relations.
a pricing strategy. In the absence of the FDI option, the domestic firms would set p f  high enough
to induce the exit of firm f (vertical foreclosure). However, firm f can respond by investing in a local
intermediate goods plant. Since local production reduces the marginal cost of firm f by a factor t ,
the FDI choice implies a detoriation of the relative cost position of the domestic firms which results
in lower variable profits.13 Hence, the cooperating domestic firms have an incentive to set p f  as
high as possible but just below the FDI inducing level: we call this the ‘FDI pre-empting’ price.
Cooperation in the context of an LCR has a strategic significance in that it allows for a FDI pre-
empting strategy.
We can now describe the conditions under which any of the four possible outcomes of the
game is the equilibrium outcome. Sufficient conditions for NL to be the equilibrium outcome are:
P PNL
f
NF
f G> - ; (1a)
P PNL
T
CL
T j jF> - / g ; (1b)
P PNL
T
CF
T j jF> - / g . (1c)
Where a superscript T denotes the sum of variable profits of firms u and d, j Î {u, d}, and the
parameter g denotes bargaining power with g gd u+  = 1. Condition (1a) determines that firm f
chooses local sourcing if the domestic firms choose not to cooperate, and conditions (1b) and (1c)
establish that the domestic firms do not cooperate. Sufficient conditions for CL to be the
equilibrium outcome are:
P PCL
f
CF
f G> - ; (2a)
P PCL
T
NL
T j jF> + / g ; (2b)
P PCL
T
NF
T j jF> + / g . (2c)
                                                                                                                                                    
12 Such price discrimination does not work in case of non-cooperation since firms d and f will be able to practice
arbitrage.
13 A characteristic of FDI here is that it involves a transformation of variable cost into fixed cost. See Motta
(1992) and Smith (1987) for a similar treatment of FDI.
NF is the equilibrium outcome if:
P PNF
f
NL
fG- > ; (3a)
P PNF
T
CL
T j jF> - / g ; (3b)
P PNF
T
CF
T j jF> - / g . (3c)
CF is the outcome if:
P PCF
f
CL
fG- > ; (4a)
P PCF
T
NF
T j jF> + / g ; (4b)
P PCF
T
NL
T j jF> + / g . (4c)
Following the circumstances under which LCRs were imposed in the EU color television
industry and in order to focus on the potential of the LCR to bring about shifts in equilibrium
outcomes, it is assumed that in an initial equilibrium situation (characterized by the absence of a
LCR) there is non-cooperation and firm f imports all intermediates from abroad. This situation is
denoted by NL* (an asterisk indicates the absence of the LCR). This implies that the following
conditions hold:
P PNF
f
NL
fG* *- < ; (5a)
P PCF
f
CL
fG* *- < ; (5b)
P PCL
T
NL
T j jF* * /< + g . (5c)
Conditions 5a and 5b establish that FDI does not occur under free trade, and condition 5c
establishes that if firm f chooses to rely on imports under free trade, cooperation is not chosen.
3 LCRs, FDI, and the Gains from Vertical Cooperation
The introduction of the LCR affects both domestic firms’ incentives to cooperate and the
foreign firm’s FDI decision. The effect of the LCR crucially depends on industry structure, in
particular economies of scale, the cost advantage of firm f in intermediate goods production, the cost
of cooperation, and the size of the market. We solve the three stage game by backward induction
and examine the FDI decision by firm f first.
3.1 FDI Versus Local Sourcing
Foreign firm f chooses between FDI and local sourcing given that the host country firms have
chosen non-cooperation or cooperation in the first stage of the game. At the final stage of the game,
output levels are determined following Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We start with the situation in
which the host country firms have chosen non-cooperation.
Non-Cooperation
In case of non-cooperation, firm u sells its intermediate goods to firms d and f at the same
arm’s length price p p pa f d= =  (where a superscript a denotes the arm’s length price). Firm
f would prefer to import all intermediates, but is forced to source e  q f  locally. This successive
market power model has been examined in Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997, 106-109) in case of
equal ‘landed’ costs for intermediates (c c tu f= + ). Here we allow for a potential efficiency
advantage of firm f, i.e. a cost advantage greater than unit transport cost. The LCR increases
demand for intermediate goods and affects the equilibrium price charged by firm u. The profit
maximizing price for each positive value of the LCR can be calculated as:
p c t c t c c ta f f u f= + +
+
- +
- - + - -
( )
( )
( ) / ( ) /
1
1
1 4 2
2
e
e e
(6)
The intermediate good price is a mark-up higher than the export costs of firm f. The price is an
increasing function of the LCR up to a level, at which it declines with a further rise in the LCR.14
This non-linearity arises because at high levels of the LCR, a further rise in the price has a large
effect on average cost in the downstream industry, depressing demand for final and intermediate
goods. In case firm f has an efficiency advantage, i.e. in case the marginal cost of upstream firm u is
high, it has to set the market price higher to maintain a sufficient margin.
Variable profits of firm f can be expressed as a function of the price of the intermediate:
P NL
f f a fc t p c t s  = - - + - - -[ ( )( )] /1 1 2 92e (7)
Profits of firm f are strongly decreasing in the LCR. The LCR works both through a direct effect,
forcing firm f to procure intermediates at higher marginal cost, and through an indirect effect: a rise
in the LCR in itself increases pa  up to a point. For high LCRs profits are still decreasing but at a
lower pace since the effect through the intermediate good price is reversed.
If firm f chooses FDI, its variable profits are:
P NF
f f u fs c c c= - + -[ ( ) ( )] /
5
4
1
1
2
92 (8)
Profits depend on the relative cost position of firm f, the size of the market, and the intensity of
demand (1- c f ). Firm f chooses FDI if P PNF
f
NL
f G> + . FDI is more likely to be chosen the
lower plant setup cost G  (i.e. the smaller the economies of scale in intermediate goods
production), the larger the market (i.e. the easier economies of scale can be reaped in case of local
production), the higher the unit transport cost, and the greater the efficiency advantage of firm f. The
LCR increases the likelihood that FDI is chosen by reducing profits under local sourcing.
Cooperation
Consider now the case where the domestic firms have chosen cooperation in the first stage of
the game. The domestic firms behave as a vertically integrated firm. If firm f chooses FDI, profits of
firm f follow the standard expression for Nash-Cournot duopoly profits:
[ ]PCFf f u fs - c c c= + -1 9
2
( ) / (9)
By comparison with (8) it is clear that profits of firm f are lower than in the non-cooperation case
(P PCF
f
NF
f< ). The host country firms have improved their competitive position by eliminating
the mark-up on intra-group deliveries of the intermediate good and this negatively affects variable
profits of firm f.
The cooperating domestic firms may prefer the foreign firm not to engage in FDI as local
production reduces their variable profits by lowering marginal costs of firm f.15 The host country
firms can commit to sell intermediate goods to the foreign firm at a unit price which makes local
sourcing of e q f  units marginally more profitable than net profits under FDI and cooperation in
(9): P PCL
f
CF
f G> - . For convenience, it is assumed that if the foreign firm is indifferent
between FDI and local sourcing, it chooses the latter. Profits of firm f under local sourcing and
vertical cooperation are:
[ ]PCLf f u f fs c t + c  2 p c t  = - + - - -1 2 92( ) ) /e   ( (10)
Profits decline in the LCR and in the price of the intermediate, and increase with the efficiency
advantage of firm f. Let the FDI pre-empting price be denoted by p f * . Using (9) and (10) we get
the expression for the FDI pre-empting price:
[ ]p = c t c t cf f f u* ( )+ + - + + -12 1 2e w , " >e 0 (11)
                                                                                                                                                    
14 This level can be calculated as Ö3 - 1 » 0.73.
15 It is assumed that the FDI threat is credible. If this is not the case, it is optimal for the cooperating domestic
firms to force the exit of firm f through vertical foreclosure. A sufficient condition for a credible FDI threat is the
existence of positive profits under FDI: PCF
f G- > 0This may not be a necessary condition: since firm f
has already invested in a local assembly plant, exit may not occur even if it makes variable losses under FDI.
where w = c c G sf u( ) /1 2 92- + - . The pre-empting price is equal to marginal export
cost of firm f plus a mark-up. The mark-up (the term between brackets on the right hand side of
(11))16 is higher, the lower is the transport cost and the greater are the scale economies relative to the
size of the host country market (the greater is G s/ ). Both imply disincentives for FDI. It can also
be shown that the FDI pre-empting price can be set higher, the smaller the cost advantage of firm f.
A smaller efficiency advantage implies lower profit levels of firm f, which makes it less likely that it
can recoup the fixed cost G in case of FDI. An increase in the LCR, on the other hand, is associated
with a lower FDI pre-empting price. A LCR increase forces firm f to source more intermediate
goods at a premium, driving down its profits. The FDI pre-empting price has to be reduced to keep
profits at the FDI threshold level.
In conclusion, the FDI decision depends crucially on the decision by the domestic firms
whether to cooperate in the first stage of the game. FDI will not occur in case of vertical cooperation
as long as the host country firms find a FDI pre-empting strategy beneficial. The introduction and
further increases in the LCR in that case have no effect on the FDI decision, since host firms adapt
the price on deliveries to firm f in response. In general, the incentives for FDI are lowered in case of
cooperation due to the improved relative cost position of host country firms, which results in lower
profit levels of firm f. The next section examines under which circumstances vertical cooperation
and FDI pre-empting will occur.
                                                   
16 The condition that the term between brackets is greater than zero is equal to the condition that under free trade
DFI is not beneficial for the multinational: P PCF
f
CL
f G* *< + . This condition holds by assumption (5b).
3.2 The Decision to Cooperate
We now consider the cooperation decision by domestic firms in the first stage of the game by
examining the payoffs corresponding to the different outcomes of the game.
Non-cooperation with Local Sourcing
If the host country firms do not cooperate and firm f then chooses local sourcing, profits of firm
d are:
P NL
d f u fc t c c t s  = - -
- +
- +
- - - -[( ) ( )( )] /1
5 5 2
1
4 2 144
2
2
2e e
e e
e (12)
The first term first decreases in the LCR and only recovers to the free trade level if the LCR is set to
unity. This negative effect of the LCR arises because the increase in p a associated with a rise in the
LCR hurts firm d (which sources all its intermediates from u), more than firm f (which only sources
up to the local content requirement).17 Th  second term depends on the efficiency advantage of firm f
and is increasing in the LCR. The greater the efficiency advantage of firm f, the greater its cost
increase if it is forced to procure intermediates from u, and the greater the improvement in the
relative cost position of firm d. It can be derived that the LCR cannot increase profits of firm d as
long as p a  increases in response to LCR.
Profits of the upstream firm u are derived as:
P NL
u
f u fc t c c t
s  =
- - + - - - - +
- +
[( )( ) ( )( )]
/
1 1 2 1
1
24
2 2
2
e e e
e e
(13)
In the absence of an efficiency advantage of firm f, profits of firm u are a monotonously increasing
function of the LCR. Profits are lower the weaker the relative cost position of firm u. The
imposition of the LCR reduces direct competition from f and the negative effect of its cost
disadvantage, but only up to a point (at e =0.5). After this point, further increases in the LCR have
a stronger effect on average cost in the final goods industry which depresses demand. The aggregate
effect of the LCR is an increase in the upstream firm’s profits for all but the highest levels of the
LCR.18 It can also be shown that the sum of profits of firms d and u, P P PNL
T
NL
d
NL
u= + , is an
increasing function of the LCR, but this increase is smaller in the presence of an efficiency
advantage of firm f.
Non-Cooperation with FDI
If under non-cooperation firm f chooses FDI, profits of firms d and u become:
P NF
d f u fc c c s  = - - -[ ( ) ( )] /
1
2
1 92 (14)
P NF
u f u fc c c s  = - - -[ ( ) ( )] /
1
2
1 62 (15)
Under FDI firm f avoids both the LCR and transport cost t . This allows it to increase profits,
partly at the cost of firms u and d. Profits of firm d are not necessarily lower than under local
sourcing in (12), since small LCRs negatively affect the latter. Profits of firm u are always lower
than profits under local sourcing in (13), as are total domestic profits (P PNF
T
NL
T< ).19 Hence, if
the imposition of the LCR induces FDI by firm f, the host country firms have a strong incentive to
cooperate and set the price of the intermediate strategically to pre-empt this investment.
                                                                                                                                                    
17 See Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997) for a more detailed discussion.
18 It can be derived that a sufficient condition for ¶ ¶ e     P NL
u / > 0 is e  < 0.815.
19 In case of free trade, profits under non-cooperation and export are already higher than profits under non-
cooperation and FDI. This can be seen by summing up (14) and (15) which gives
Õ = Õ = - - -NF
T
NF
T f u fc c c s  * [ ( ) ( )] /5
1
2
1 182 , while summing up (12) and (13) after
substituting e = 0 gives Õ = - - - - -NL
T f u fc t c c t s  * [ ( ) ( )] /5
1
2
1 182 , which is
greater. The imposition of the LCR increases NL profits but leaves NF profits unaffected, increasing this
difference.
Cooperation with Local Sourcing
Vertical cooperation delivers efficiency gains through the elimination of successive mark-ups
similar to the case of vertical integration. It also provides strategic gains, i.e. the potential of
strategic pricing of intermediates sold to firm f, but involves a cost F T . If the cooperating firms set
the price p f at the level which pre-empts FDI by firm f, joint profits of the host country firms are:
PCL
T f u f f f s c t c c t p c t= - - - - - + - -[ ( ) )] /*1 2 92e  (
+ -e  q p cf f u( )* (16)
The first term on the right hand side of (16) represent profits earned on the final goods market, and
the second term expresses profits on the sale of intermediates to firm f. Given the FDI pre-empting
price, an increase in the LCR increases profits on the final goods market, and, as long as the FDI
pre-empting price is higher than marginal cost cu , pr fi s on the sale of intermediates to firm f.
However, with each increase in the LCR, the FDI pre-empting price has to be reduced in order to
keep profits of firm f at the level attainable under FDI. The implication is that profits on the final
goods market are not affected by changes in the LCR.20 Profits on the intermediate are also
unaffected by the LCR in case of equal efficiency (c c tu f= + ), but decrease in the LCR if firm
f has an efficiency advantage. In the latter case, the FDI pre-empting price has to be reduced by such
a large margin in response to an increase in the LCR that total profits decrease. This implies that, if
an LCR is imposed to protect an inefficient domestic industry, this industry benefits more, the
smaller the LCR. In case of equal efficiency, the one-off strategic gain of the imposition of the LCR
(which allows for price discrimination and FDI pre-empting) is what matters, not the level of the
LCR.
It can easily be derived that as long as p cf u* >  (a sufficient but not a necessary condition is
that firm f does not have an efficiency advantage), host country firms’ variable profits under
cooperation exceed profits under free trade (P PCL
T
CL
T> * ). Hence, while cooperation was not
beneficial under free trade due to the associated cost (condition (5c):
P PCL
T
NL
T j jF* * /< + g ), the introduction of the LCR opens the possibility of cooperation.
Cooperation and FDI pre-empting is the likely equilibrium outcome of the game if PCL
T  is
sufficiently higher than both P NL
T  and P NF
T  (conditions (2b) and (2c)).21 Since
P P PCL
T
NL
T
NF
T> >* , condition (2c) is likely to hold as long as the cost F
T  is no too high. In
addition, a small LCR has the maximum positive effect on cooperation profits but only a small
positive effect on profits under non-cooperation and local sourcing. This is because a small LCR
only has a correspondingly small effect on P NL
T  (in (12) and (13)), while it allows for a high FDI
pre-empting price in (11) and a jump in profits in case of cooperation. In case there are important
economies of scale in intermediate goods production (G  large), the FDI pre-empting price and
profits under cooperation are particularly high and a small LCR increases the likelihood that the
host country firms choose to cooperate. If the LCR is set a higher levels, profits under non-
cooperation and local sourcing rise while profits under cooperation may decline (in case domestic
firms have an inefficiency disadvantage). The incentives to cooperate decline in the LCR.
Cooperation with FDI
There are circumstances under which the host country firms will not find a FDI pre-empting
strategy beneficial. If firm f has an efficiency advantage and if economies of scale in intermediate
goods production are not important (G  small), then the FDI pre-empting price falls below the
marginal cost of firm u. In other words, the host country firms have to sell intermediates below
marginal cost in order to keep the foreign firm from investing in a local plant.22 In these
circumstances, a FDI pre-empting strategy is unlikely to be beneficial. In that case, FDI will occur
and cooperation only delivers efficiency gains. Total domestic variable profits under cooperation
become:
PCF
T f u fc c c s  = - - -4
1
2
1 92[ ( ) ( )] / (17)
                                                                                                                                                    
20 If (11) is substituted in the first term on the right hand side of (16), the LCR disappears from the expression.
21 Condition (2a) holds by assumption under FDI pre-empting.
22 It is possible that such strategic dumping is the equilibrium outcome, as long as the losses on sales to the
foreign firm are limited and can be recouped on the final goods market.
The efficiency advantage allows the host country firms to increase variable profits in comparison
with the sum of non-cooperation profits under FDI in (14) and (15). However, this increase is not
sufficient to offset the cost of cooperation. This can be seen as follows. In case of FDI the LCR is
not binding such that profits under free trade are equal to profits with an LCR in place
(P PCF
T
CF
T
* = ), while profits under FDI are always lower than profits under export and free trade,
hence P PCF
T
CL
T< * . We have also seen that total profits under non-cooperation and local
sourcing (NL) are an increasing function of the LCR such that P PNL
T
NL
T> * . Since we have from
(5c) that P PCL
T
NL
T j jF* * /< + g , it follows that P PCF
T
NL
T j jF< + / g  (condition (4c)
does not hold). In other words, if the domestic firms do not cooperate in the free trade situation, they
will certainly not cooperate in response to the LCR if such cooperation is associated with FDI.
Also, we know that the incentives to cooperate are smaller in case of FDI compared with export:
( ) ( ) ( )* * * *P P P P P PCF
T
NF
T
CF
T
NF
T
CL
T
NL
T- = - < - , since profit levels under export are
higher due to the transport cost firm f has to pay.23 Inserting this in (5c) it follows that
P PCF
T
NF
T j jF< + / g  (4b does not hold). Hence, in case firm f chooses FDI in case of non-
cooperation, the host firms neither have an incentive to cooperate. The implication is that
cooperation and FDI (CF) is ruled out as an equilibrium outcome.
3.3 Cost structure and Cooperation
What are the precise conditions under which a FDI pre-empting strategy is not beneficial? If
FDI pre-empting is not beneficial and with CF ruled out, the host country firms will either earn NF
or NL profits. Under the circumstances which make FDI pre-empting less beneficial (limited
economies of scale and an efficiency advantage of firm f), the market price of intermediates in case
of NL in (6) is high and P NL
f  in (7) is at a low level. Given the assumed small fixed cost G , it is
highly unlikely that (1a) holds at more than marginal levels of the LCR, such that firm f will choose
to invest and NF is the equilibrium outcome. The relevant comparison for host country firms
                                                   
23 This conditions translates to: [ ] [ ]1 2 1 22 2- + < - + +c c c c tu f u f , which holds.
therefore is between profits under CL and NF. Using (16) and (11) and (14) and (15) we derive that
P PCL
T
NF
T<  holds if:
( )
( ) / ( ) /
( )
c c
c c t G s
c c
u f
f u
f u
- >
+ - - - +
- + - -
1 2 8 1 15 4
1 2 1
2 e w
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(18)
Cooperation breaks down if the cost advantage of firm f reaches a certain threshold level. This level
is lower, the smaller the scale economies, the larger the market, the higher the LCR, and the higher
the transport cost: all factors which reduce the FDI pre-empting price in (11). Equation (18) is a
necessary condition for cooperation to be beneficial. Whether cooperation is chosen also depends on
the cost of cooperation relative to the bargaining power of firm u or d. The gain in variable profits
should offset the cost of cooperation: P PCL
T
NF
T j jF> + / g  in (2c). In general, if the
institutional setting is such that the cost of cooperation is very high, the gains in variable profits in
case of cooperation may not be sufficient compensation even when economies of scale allow for a
high FDI pre-empting price. These are the circumstances under which non-cooperation and local
sourcing (NL) is most likely to arise.
It is useful to illustrate the effect of cost structure on equilibrium outcome by examining profit
functions for some numerical examples. Figures 1a - 1c represent three contrasting cases, each
associated with a different equilibrium outcome. Case 1 represents the equal efficiency, economies
of scale case which typically leads to CL equilibrium (the parameter settings are: cU =0.3,
c f =0.25, t =0.05, s=1, F T =0.03, G =0.06).24 In Case 2, economies of scale are limited and the
foreign firm has an efficiency advantage (cU =0.3, c f =0.15, t =0.05, s=1,
F T =0.03G =0.025), leading to NF equilibrium. Case 3 is as Case 1, but now the cost of
cooperation is high (cU =0.3, c f =0.25, t =0.05, s=1, F T =0.08, G =0.06) and NL equilibrium
will result. Figures 1a - 1c depict total host country firm profits for each of the four possible
outcomes (CL, NL, NF, CF) as a function of the LCR. The bold line shows equilibrium profits as a
function of the LCR. The vertical line marks the level of the LCR at which firm f chooses FDI in
                                                   
24 For convenience it is assumed that bargaining power and costs of cooperation are symmetric:
g gd u= = 1 and F Fu d= .
case of non-cooperation (P PNF
f
NL
f G> + ): on right side of this line, NL is not an equilibrium
outcome.
In Figure 1a (Case 1), the introduction of the LCR allows host country firms to sharply
increase joint profits: free trade profits (at the level where the NL profit line crosses the Y-axis) are
doubled. CL profits are unaffected by the level of the LCR in this equal cost case. For LCRs greater
than 0.69, NL profits exceed CL profits. However, NL equilibrium is not feasible since firm f
would invest in response (for LCRs greater than 0.61) and NF would result. Hence, CL profits are
the maximum attainable and CL remains the equilibrium outcome. In Figure 1b (Case 2), the
vertical line marking the FDI choice by firm f has shifted to the left, due to the smaller scale
economies and the presence of an efficiency advantage. The CL profit function has shifted
downward and is now a declining function of the LCR. Although NL provides the highest profits, it
is not an equilibrium outcome for LCRs higher than 0.11 and NF results. It can also be seen that the
introduction of a LCR higher than 0.11 reduces profits below the free trade level. In Figure 1c (Case
3) the CL profit line has shifted downwards as a result of the higher cost of cooperation (the CF
profit line has also shifted downward to the extent that the CF outcome is loss-making). NL is the
equilibrium outcome up to a relatively high level of the LCR (0.61), after which FDI (NF) occurs.
3.4 Summary
The introduction of the LCR can have markedly contrasting consequences, corresponding to
the various outcomes of game, and depending on the cost conditions in the industry. If economies of
scale are important in intermediate good production and domestic firms do not have an efficiency
disadvantage, a small LCR increases the likelihood that host country firms decide to cooperate.
Cooperation allows the host country firms to set the price of intermediates sold to the foreign firm
strategically to pre-empt FDI, and cooperation delivers strategic as well as efficiency gains. The
introduction of the LCR increases profits of the domestic firms and reduces profits of the foreign
firm. This FDI pre-empting scenario resembles the case of EU color television and cathode ray tube
production discussed in section 1. On the other hand, if economies of scale are not important
relative to the size of the market and if host country firms are inefficient, the introduction of the LCR
is likely to induce FDI, while it makes cooperation less likely to occur. In this case, the introduction
of the LCR reduces profits of both the host country firms (P PNF
T
NL
T< *) and the foreign
multinational (P PNF
f
NL
TG- < * ). This FDI scenario corresponds with the experience of LCRs
and Japanese FDI in manufacturing plants for a number of other television components such as
power sources and plastic moldings. In a third scenario, the LCR does not induce cooperation nor
FDI. This outcome is most likely to arise if the cost of cooperation is high and economies of scale
are important. In this scenario, the LCR allows the upstream firm to increase its profits at the cost of
both downstream firms.
4. Welfare Implications
Total domestic welfare W consists of consumer surplus and the profits of the domestic firms,
while the profits of the firm f are assumed to be expatriated: W =CS+ d uP P+ , where CS
denotes consumer surplus. The consequences for consumers are considered first after which total
domestic welfare is discussed.
Consumer Surplus
We examine the effects of the LCR on consumer surplus by comparing the level of consumer
surplus under the initial situation of free trade (NL*) with the level of consumer surplus under the
various outcomes of the game after the introduction of the LCR. Consumer surplus before the
introduction of the LCR is:
CS c - c c t sNL
f u f
* [ ( ) ( ) ] /= - - -
7
4
1
1
2
5
4
182 (19)
Consumer surplus is a negative function of average cost in the final goods industry. The latter
increase in the marginal cost of the foreign firm, the efficiency disadvantage of the host country’s
firm u, and transport cost.
If the introduction of the LCR induces FDI but no cooperation consumer surplus is:
CS c - c c sNF
f u f= - -[ ( ) ( )] /
7
4
1
1
2
182 (20)
The LCR increases consumer surplus because FDI is associated with lower variable cost of firm f
which avoids the transport cost (CS CSNF NL> * ). If the LCR leads to non-cooperation while
firm f chooses local sourcing consumer surplus is:
CS c t - c c t sNL
f u f= - -
- +
- - - +[( )( ) ( )( )] /1
7
4
3
4 1
1
2
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e
(21)
The LCR increases market power of firm f and the price on the intermediate goods market,
increasing costs in the final goods industry and reducing consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is
always lower than consumer surplus under free trade in (19) and this difference is increasing in the
LCR: CS CSNL NL< * . The LCR also exacerbates the negative effect on consumer surplus of a
cost disadvantage of firm u. Finally, if the LCR induces a FDI pre-empting strategy by the host
country firms, consumer surplus is:
CS c sCL
u= - +[ ( ) ] /
6
4
1
1
2
182w (22)
On the one hand, consumers gain as the host country firms cooperate and eliminate the inefficiency
associated with the mark-up for arm’s length transactions. On the other hand, intermediate goods
are sold to firm f at a price c tf f* > + , which increases costs of firm f. Comparing (22) and
(19) it is derived that consumer surplus increases compared with the free trade situation
(CS CSCL NL> * ) if: 2 1 4w  > - - + - -( ) ( )c t c c t
f u f . This condition is more
likely to be fulfilled if economies of scale are limited relative to the size of the market (G s/  low),
since the FDI pre-empting price is set lower and the consequences of the LCR for consumer surplus
are less serious. Consumer surplus is more likely to increase the higher the transport cost: this cost
reduces consumer surplus under free trade but has no effect on consumer surplus under FDI pre-
empting in (22). It can be shown that consumer surplus is more likely to rise, the lower the cost
c f of the foreign firm (resulting in a higher efficiency advantage). This situation leads to a lower
FDI pre-empting price with positive consequences for consumer surplus. However, under the above
conditions it is also more likely that FDI pre-empting is not beneficial to the host country firms. In
other words, if industry conditions are such that FDI pre-empting is likely to occur as a response to
the imposition of the LCR, it is also less likely to have positive welfare consequences for
consumers.
Figure 2 illustrates the consequences for consumer surplus by examining the three contrasting
cases described in section 3.3. In the CL equilibrium case (Case 1) the introduction of the LCR
leads to a small decline in consumer surplus compared with the free trade equilibrium. In Case 2
(NF equilibrium for LCRs exceeding 0.11) consumer surplus increases. In Case 3, NL equilibrium
(up to a value of the LCR of 0.61) is associated with a substantial decline in consumer surplus.
Total Domestic Welfare
The different effects of the introduction of the LCR on profits of firm u and firm d and
consumer surplus do not allow us to derive an unambiguous ranking of outcomes in terms of total
domestic welfare. We compare the welfare outcomes with the free trade outcome and illustrate
welfare effects by examining the three cases described in the previous section.
If the imposition of the LCR induces FDI but no cooperation (NF), consumer surplus rises
while total host country profits decline. It can be shown that the rise in consumer surplus always
more than offsets the reduction in profits: host country welfare increases.25 I  case NL is the
equilibrium outcome, the LCR increases profits but reduces consumer surplus. In the absence of an
efficiency advantage of firm f, it has been shown that host country welfare remains below welfare
under free trade for all but the highest levels of the LCR.26 I firm f has an efficiency advantage, the
LCR is even less likely to increase domestic welfare. The LCR forces firm f to procure high-cost
                                                   
25 The negative profit shifting effect of the reduction in firm f’s marginal cost weighs less because profits of
domestic producers are relatively small, given the inefficiency associated with the mark-up on arm’s length sales
of intermediates. Conversely, a ‘raising rival’s cost’ strategy under these circumstances cannot increase host
country welfare [Sleuwaegen et al. (forthcoming)].
26 See Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997). Welfare can only rises above the free trade level if e  > 0.87. The
qualitative result also holds in case of successive oligopoly (multiple upstream and downstream firms).
intermediates, increasing industry costs and reducing consumer surplus more strongly, while the
positive effect of the LCR on host country profits is reduced.
If the LCR induces FDI pre-empting cooperation, host country firms’ profits increase.
Consumer surplus may increase, but only in the circumstances which make FDI pre-empting
cooperation less likely to occur. Numerical analysis shows that the positive effect on profits in most
cases more than offsets the negative effect on consumer surplus. Welfare can decline, but only in a
setting where both the cost of cooperation and the plant setup cost G  are high and the foreign firm
has an efficiency advantage. In this situation, FDI pre-empting (CL) allows for only a limited
increase in host country firms’ profits and leads to a high price of intermediates sold to firm f, which
results in a substantial decline in consumer surplus.
The effects on domestic welfare are illustrated in Figure 3, which sets out total domestic
welfare as a function of the LCR for the three case. The introduction of the LCR increases welfare
in case of CL equilibrium (Case 1). The welfare graphs for Case 2 illustrates that NF equilibrium
results in higher welfare levels. Welfare is reduced in case of NL equilibrium (Case 3).
In conclusion, if the LCR results in FDI pre-empting, cooperation allows for efficient rent
shifting, leading to a substantial increase in host country profits. This increase exceeds a likely
decline in consumer surplus such that domestic welfare rises. In case the LCR induces FDI,
domestic welfare increases, but in this case the gains for consumers exceed the decline in host
country profits. Finally, in case of the non-cooperation and local sourcing outcome, profits of the
intermediate goods producer rise but at the cost of a reduction in both consumer and total welfare.
5. Conclusions
We examined the effects of a local content requirement (LCR) in the context of potential
vertical cooperation between a host country’s upstream and downstream producers and foreign
direct investment (FDI) in upstream manufacturing by a foreign multinational. A three stage game
was developed in which the host country firms first decide on cooperation after which the foreign
firm decides on FDI. The relationship-specific investment which sustains cooperation between the
host country firms also allows them to commit to a FDI pre-empting strategy through manipulation
of the price of intermediates supplied to the foreign firm. The set-up was inspired by the case of
LCRs imposed on Japanese manufacturers of color televisions in the European Union, which led to
Japanese FDI for some components, but local sourcing from vertically integrated EU firms for
others.
We showed that the equilibrium outcome of this game is strongly dependent on the presence of
economies of scale in the upstream industry, a possible cost advantage of the foreign multinational,
and the cost of cooperation. In the presence of economies of scale and equal variable costs, the
introduction of a LCR is most likely to induce vertical cooperation and a FDI pre-empting strategy.
In this scenario, the LCR both results in an efficiency gain as vertical cooperation eliminates the
internal mark-up associated with arm’s length deliveries, and a strategic gain as FDI is avoided. The
LCR is effective as a profit shifting instrument (profits of domestic firms increase). Although
consumer surplus is likely to be negatively affected, total domestic welfare increases. If the host
country industry has a cost disadvantage, cooperation may still occur, but high LCRs reduce host
country profits and the incentives to cooperate.
If economies of scale are not important and if host country firms have a cost disadvantage, the
imposition of the LCR induces FDI but cooperation does not occur. In this scenario, the LCR
reduces profits of domestic firms as well as profits of the foreign firm. On the other hand, the
reduction in variable costs of the foreign firm results in an increa e in consumer surplus, while total
domestic welfare increases as well. In a third scenario, which is most likely to arise if the cost of
cooperation is high and economies of scale are present, the foreign firm is most likely to choose
local sourcing to satisfy the LCR while cooperation is less likely to occur. The LCR shifts profits to
the upstream firm, while profits of both downstream firms as well as consumer surplus and total
welfare decline.
The findings show that, once FDI and vertical cooperation are taken nto account, LCRs can
have a broad range of consequences. The presence of market power of upstream firms does not
necessarily imply strong output and welfare reducing effects of the LCR as in Belderbos and
Sleuwaegen (1997). In contrast with Beghin and Sumner (1992) the LCR does affect the final
goods prices in case of vertical cooperation, but the strategic effect of the LCR allows for a more
effective rent shifting from the foreign multinational to host country firms at smaller cost to
consumers. The result that host country welfare also benefits in the FDI scenario corresponds with
previous analysis which allowed for FDI but in rather different settings [Richardson (1993),
Hollander (1987)].
Our analysis has focused on the conditions under which the introduction of a LCR may foster
vertical cooperation between domestic firms and treated these firms as first movers. These features
of the model stemmed from our interest in the relationship between LCRs and vertical cooperation
and the fact that Japanese manufacturers tended to engage in FDI only after LCRs were imposed.
An interesting extension would be to also consider the implications of strategic FDI by granting the
foreign firm a first mover advantage. A contrasting extension with different implications is the case
where a cost disadvantage of domestic firms derives from unfavorable locational factors, such that
the foreign firm also faces a rise in marginal cost if it invests in the host country.27 T e e
considerations provide ample scope for future research.
                                                   
27 As in Belderbos (1997, chapter 3).
Figure 1a: Host Country Firms’ Total Profits as a Function of the LCR: Case 1
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Figure 1b: Host Country Firms’ Total Profits as a Function of the LCR: Case 2
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Figure 1c: Host Country Firms’ Total Profits as a Function of the LCR: Case 3
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Figure 2: Consumer Surplus as a Function of the LCR: Three Cases
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Figure 3: Domestic Welfare as a Function of the LCR: Three Cases
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
LCR
welfare
References
Beghin, J.C., and D.A. Sumner (1992), `Domestic content requirements with bilateral monopoly,'
Oxford Economic Papers 44, 306-316.
Beghin, J.C., and C.A. Knox Lovell (1993), `Trade and efficiency effects of domestic content
protection: the Australian tobacco and cigarette industries,' The Review of Economics and
Statistics 75, 623-631.
Belderbos, R.A. (1997), Japanese electronics multinationals and strategic trade policies,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Belderbos, R.A. and L.I.E. Sleuwaegen (1997), `Local content requirement and vertical market
structure,' European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13, 101-119.
Bughin, J., and S. Vannini (1994), `Strategic direct investment under unionized oligopoly,'
International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 127-145.
Burton, F.N., and F.H. Saelens (1987), `Trade barriers and Japanese foreign direct investment in
the colour television industry,' Managerial and Decision Economics 8, 285-293.
Chao, C.C., and E.S.H. Yu (1993), `Content protection, urban unemployment and welfare,'
Canadian Journal of Economics 26, 481-492.
Chung, T.Y. (1995), `On strategic commitment: contracting versus investment,' American
Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 437-441.
Cordella, T., and S. Vannini (1995), `Foreign direct investment and strategic trade policies,' A
revised version of C.O.R.E. discussion paper no. 9356, Université Catholique de Louvain.
Corden, W.M. (1971) The theory of protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
D’Aveni, R.A., and D.J. Ravenscraft (1994), `Economies of integration versus bureaucracy costs: 
does vertical integration improve performance?’ Academy of management Journal 37(5), 
1167-1206.
Davidson, C., S.J. Matusz, and M.E. Kreinin (1987), `Analysis of performance standards for direct
foreign investments,' Canadian Journal of Economics, 876-890.
Dei, F. (1990), `A note on multinational corporations in a model of reciprocal dumping,' Journ l of
International Economics 29, 161-171.
Dixit, A.K., and G.M. Grossman (1982), `Trade and protection with multistage production,'
Review of Economic Studies, 583-594.
Fung, M.K.Y. (1994), `Content protection, resource allocation, and variable labour supply,'
Canadian Journal of Economics 27, 175-182.
Greenhut, M.L., and H. Ohta (1979), `Vertical integration of successive oligopolies,' American
Economic Review 69, 137-141.
Grossman, G.M. (1981), `The theory of domestic content protection and content preference,'
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 583-603.
Hamel, G., Doz, Y.L., and C.K. Prahalad (1989), `Collaborate with your competitors - and Win,'
Harvard Business Review, 133-139.
Hollander, A. (1987), `Content protection and transnational monopoly,' Journal of International
Economics 23, 283-297.
Krishna, K., and M. Itoh (1988), `Content protection and oligopolistic interactions,' Review of
Economic Studies, 107-125.
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., J.R. Markusen, and T.F. Rutherford (1996), ‘Trade policy subtleties with
multinational firms’, European Economic Review 40, 105-1627.
Motta, M. (1992), `Multinational firms and the tariff-jumping argument,' European Economic
Review 36, 1557-1571.
Motta, M., and G. Norman (1996), `Does economic integration cause foreign direct investment?’,
International Economic Review 37, 757-783.
Mussa, M. (1984), `The economics of content protection,' NBER Working Paper No. 1457.
Porter, M.E. (1986), Competition in global Industries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press).
Richardson, M. (1991), `The effects of a content requirement on a foreign duopsonist,' Jour al of
International Economics, 143-155.
Richardson, M. (1993), `Content protection with foreign capital,' Oxford Economic Papers 45,
103-117.
Rodrik, D., and C.H. Yoon (1989), `Strategic trade policy when domestic firms compete against
vertically integrated rivals,' NBER Working Paper No. 2916.
Salinger, M.A. (1988), `Vertical mergers and market foreclosure,' Quarterly Journal of Economics
103, 345-356.
Sanna-Randaccio, F. (1996), `New protectionism and multinational companies,’ Journal of
International Economics 41, 29-51.
Sleuwaegen, L.I.E, R.A. Belderbos, and C.S.J. Jie-A-Joen (forthcoming), `Cascading contingent
protection and vertical market structure,' International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Smith, A. (1987), `Strategic investment, multinational corporations and trade policy,' Europe n
Economic Review 31, 89-96.
Spencer, B.J., and R.W. Jones (1991), `Vertical foreclosure and international trade policy,' Review
of Economic studies 58, 153-170.
Spencer, B.J., and R.W. Jones (1992), `Trade and protection in vertically related markets,' Journal
of international Economics 32, 31-55.
Tyson, L. (1992), `Who's bashing whom?: trade conflict in high-technology industries,'
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics).
Vousden, N. (1987), `Content protection and tariffs under monopoly and competition,' Journal of
International Economics 23, 263-282.
Waterson, M. (1982), `Vertical integration, variable proportions and oligopoly,' Economic Journal
92, 129-144.
Williamson, O.E. (1989), `Transaction cost economics,' In Handbook of Industrial Organization
(Volume I), ed. R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (Amsterdam: Elsevier).
